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ECONOMICS OF EXTERNAL BORROFING:

THE LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINT

AND THE TWO-GAP MODELS OF FOREIGN AID~'r

The pape r seek s to analy se some impl icati ons
of the debt 
serv ice requ irem ents for the two-g ap mode ls
of econ omic grow th buil t
aroun d the notio n of self- relia nce. The anal
ysis attem pts to poin t
out the inade quac y of the two-g ap mode ls of
fore ign aid when the exch ange
earn ings avai lable to the borro wing coun try
from expo rts and from the
non- comm itted port ion of forei gn loan s are inad
equa te to meet the debt 
serv ice requ irern ents. 1 The pape r shows it expl
icitl y that the term s
of loan s play a sign ifica nt role in shap ing
the debt -reti reme nt proc ess
not only in its influ ence over the size and
the dura tion of the savin gs
gap --- but also in the qual itati ve diffe renc
e it intro duce s in the
natu re itse lf of the (fore ign) reso urce gap.
Thus whil e the conv entio nal
liter atur e disti ngui shes betw een dome stic and
fore ign reso urce s as
supp leme nts to dome stic inves tmen t and/ or impo
rt capa city, 2 it does not
*The auth or owes a large debt to Dr. Anis ur
Rahman and to Prof . Rich ard
N. Coop er for thei r valu able comments and sugg
estio ns at cruc ial stag es
of the pres ent work . Than ks are also due to
Prof . Robe rt Trif fin for
the clar ifica tion of some basi c notio ns. The
resp onsi bilit y of the
pape r, howe ver, enti rely rests with the auth
or.

explici tly introduc e the q·Jal:Ltat i-,i, distinct ion betueen t~1e gaps in foreign
resource s and foreign exci:1ange (or simply, liquidit y).

The term of foreign

loans, as it has been shO\•m below, can under certain circums tances, introduc e

a third pre-con dition for the aid-cum grmJth process in terms of the
t 3
·
men.
"d"1 .ty-marg i n requ1.re
.
1 1.qu1.

The paper introduc es the institut ional

features of public borrowin g and seeks to examine the implica tions of such
a programme of borrowin g when the major portion of the gross inflow of
capital are committe d to the merchan dise purchas es in the current account.
The conseque nces are quite serious when one recognis es the alternat ives open
to the borrowin g country under the existing institut ional set-up.

Thus

the country facing such a crisis can meet the situatio n by drawing down
the reserves , or, alterna tively, by borrowin g larger amounts at less
favourab le tenns.

While the first method can never be a permane nt solution

to any country , the second one is accompa nied by all its repercus sions and
reinforc ing effects on the savings gap~ the trade gap, the liquidit y margin,
4
and on the termina l date for self-rel iance.
The tenns at which a country can borrow are influenc ed to a
conside rable extent by the conditio ns of supply governin g such loans.

It

is importan t to recognis e that the supply situatio n of foreign aid as
visualiz ed by the individu al recipien t of foreign aid is quite differen t from
what the donor (or the donors) takes it to be.

Thus the recipien ts are often at

too low a scale in their bargaini ng strength in relation to the donors to be
able to exercise decision s on a joint basis.

It is apparen t that the overall

supply schedule of foreign loans is always an upward rising one since aid
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other than grants are often sensitiv e to the terms offered in the market
and a sizeable portion of loans are offered at commerc ial terms.

For the

recipien t as a single country, however , one can concept ually visualiz e
a step-fun ction type of supply schedule for foreign capital 4 (a) --- each
step represen ting the maximum flow of loans at particu lar loan terms.
The range of continu ity of each st2p, again, may be shorter at higher ranges
of lcian terms.

The aid-com posite at each weighted averaf?e of loan-

terms, therefo re, is almost det~rmL: ied for the bor:ro,;dn g ccuntry and the
maximum amount of loans it is able to obtain at a partic·.2 lar. loan term

may not always be adequate to meet its total require17 1ents,

The

alterna tives left open to the recipien t often consist of an excess demand

for foreign resource s, an effectiv e matching of total demand at terms less
favourab le than before, 5 or, lastly, a reschedu ling of t:he ciebtstructur e as a temporar y solution of the problem .
The present paper introduc es certain changes in the contents of a
few convent ional concepts used in the existing literatu re on foreign aid.
Thus the inflow of foreign resource s necessa ry under the two-gap estimate s
is conside red in its net rather than in its gro·ss entirety and the savings- gap
is defined as the foreign resource necessa ry to supplem ent domestic savings
net of foreign claims.

On~ can here recall the debt-cyc le models of savings -

gap analysis 6 built around the assumpt ion of a termina l date for capital
inflow.

The contribu tion of forei3n l•Jans towards saving is in reality

limited to the initial phase when such loans contribu te towards domestic
investm ent.

It is useful to introduc e the concept of the savings -coeffic ient
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of foreign loans which relates to the entire period during which foreign
aid is forthcoming.

Thus adverse changes in the terms of borrowing

lengthen the time-period necessary to pay off such loans with a consequent
reduction in the value of the coefficient.

A recent work on the

economic criteria of foreign loans has established an inverse relation be
tween the savings-potentiality (or the coefficient, as defined above)
and the terms of such inflow.

7

The debt-retirement schedule has a more

significant bearing on the trade-gap implicit in the growth process.

It

is henceforth defined as the amount of foreign resource necessary to sup
plement the domestically earned resources from abroad net of all foreign
claims.

The inclusion of forei8n claims makes for a close relation between

the magnitude of the trade-gap and the terms of foreign loans.
has been some attempt in the literature

8

While there

to incorporate the above relation

in terms of the bearing of loan terms on the amount of gross capital inflow
necessary to maintain a stipulated grouth rate in the merchandise balance,
the more complete trade-cum-growth models do not introduce the
complications.

It is more important in the context of the present paper

to distinguish the above two gars in foreie:,. resources from a third one which
is described as the 'foreign exchange' or 'liquidity' gap.

9

The latter

can operate as a pre-condition for tts ai.d-cum-p;r-:mth process whenever. the
liquid portion of foreign loans (which consists of generally c1vailable free
exchange) constitute a fraction of the total flow of such loans.

The

terms of loans can be defined in a generalise('!_ way to cover the tied loans
and the residual elements in the terms of loans, viz., the interest rate and
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the maturity-, have an equally significant bearinp. on their quantitativ e
implication s on the liquidity margin,

The next section develops the conditions

where the liquidity-m argin requirement can operate as a third gap for the
foreign aid models and explores the structural implication s of the
constraint.

It examines the time-path of the liquidity margin under certain

specific assumptions of a simplified model for a borrowing economy and ana
lyses a few empirical solutions to project the liquidity requirement for
the borrowing countries.

The concluding section brings together the im

plications of the analytical and the empirical solutions for the existing
institution al set-up.

II

The terms of tied loans have some influence on the size as well as

the composition of the gross capital inflow.

The qualitative aspect

of the foreign-reso urce gap however, can only be specified under the
following institution al assumptions uhich are often less explicit under
the real growth models:

(i) Currencies are inconvertib le bet,.;een countries.

The

assumption, while implicit in the resource--ga p r:iodels of aid, should be

explicit in all growth models which distinguish between domestic and
foreign resources.
(ii)

The import coefficient may change with changes in the exchange

control mechanism and/or a different weightage from the different sectors.
Thus the availability of the loan itself may increase the foreign resource
gap with a certain relaxation of the import-cont rol mechanism, or simply,
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with additional purchases by the government itself.
(iii)

Foreign loans may be accompanied by contractual purchases in

the current account.

This reduces the potentiality of such loans to meet

the liquidity as distinct from the foreign resource requirement of the
recipient.

Thus the loans tied to the purchases of the recipients are

hardly as efficient in meeting the need for liquid foreign resources as
these are to meet the resource-gap for the borrower.

Thus the institutional

pattern of the loans often introduce an additional element of inflexibility
in the debt-servicing process for the recipients.

Since a large portion of

lO t h e actua1 rate o f gross
.
. d t o imports,
the to t a 1 1oans can easi·1 y b e tie
lending, though adequate in terms of the stipulated requirements to cover
the trade-gap, may not be sufficient to meet a liquidity crisis when the
exchange earnings from exports are smaller than the outstanding debt
charges.

Thus a simple increase in the volume of foreign aid is unlikely

· ll
·
h e d'
h
b ur d en went
.
ratio
eat-service
t o he 1 pthe debt-service

is

sharply increased with mounting debt-service requirements.
One can develop the liquidity margin requirement as an additional
constraint for an open economy whenever the inflow of foreign resources,

as indicated in the above assumptions, are different from the generally
available exchange under the tied loans with contractual terms of purchases.
The following set of equations illustrate the basic nature of the problem
under certain simplifying assumptions regardin~ the variables of the
model.

Thus the three instrument variables of the model, viz., i,
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o (reciprocal of amortisatio n period) and

>..(the 1iquid portion of foreign

loans) remain unchanged during the time period under considerati on.

More

over, the model accepts an exogenous rate of growth in exports (x) and
imports (m) which remain unchanged during the specified time period.

Thus

it does not introduce the functional relationship between Ft, the gross
inflow of loans, the import-coef ficient and the trade-gap itself --- as
.
d int
.
h e secon d assumption
·
·
mentione
given
a b ave. lZ

The assumptions help to

illuminate the basic nature of the problem as described in the following
set of definitiona l relations:
(1)

Lt = X0 (1 + X)
=

M (1 +
0

m)

...
L

t

+
(1

>..) F

t

The liquidity margin in period t equals the value of export earnings in
the same period plus the liquid portion (A) of the gross inflow of loans
Ft net of interest (i) and amortisatio n charges (o) on the loans outstan-

B = B
("1 + 1) + M (1 + m)t-l - X (1 + x)t-l:
t
t-1
0
0

Loans

outstanding in period t equals the outstanding indebtednes s in the preceeding
period, the interest charges on it and the merchandise balance during the
preceeding period.
{3)

F

t

= (i

+

O)B

t

+ M {1 + m)t - X (1 + x)t:
O
0

The gross inflow of

loans in period t equals the interest and the amortisatio n changes on the
loans outstanding during the current period plus an excess (or shortfall)
of imports over exports during the current period.

Ft, as indicated above,

can be identified to the trade-gap as defined in the present paper.
The equations are self-explanatory with the follo~in~ set of
terminology:
X:

value of exports in the initial period o

M:

value of imports in the initial period o

i:

rate of interest

a:

the inverse of T, the period of amortisation.

0

0

An amount which

falls due in each period on the assumption of a linear rate of amortisation.

A:

the lj_quid portion of loans under the terms of tied credits

x,m: exogenous rates of growth for exports and imports.
The model incorporates the implications of the debt-service requirements
for the borrowing economy in the process of growth.

Hhile equation (3)

restates the 'trade-gap' in terms of the debt-service requirements,
equation (1) indicates the need for an additional target in terms of a
possible gap between the total supply of 2-nd the need for internationally
liquid resources.

The equality condition indicates the possibility of a

crisis whenever Lt drops down to

zero.

Strictly speaking, Lt can never

be negative since it is always financed ex post by external liquid resources.
There can, however, be always an ex ante situation where the borrowing coun
try can always forecast a negative Lt and try to correct the situation by
changing the values of the parameters (i,o, and;\) whenever Lt tends to
decline to zero.

The recipient clear1.v finds it unnecessary to deplete

its external resources, to borrow at less favourable terms or to ask for
a rescheduling of loans so long Lt is :,ositive.

It is thus important for

the borrow ing country to mainta in a positiv e liquidi ~y margin in order
to
avoid adverse changes in

th,~

terns of nar~in al harrowi ng and/or in the

desired ratio of the c.r.P. covered by such borrow ing.
It is

useful

to study the time-pa th cf the liquidi ty-mar gin and

analyse the structu ral nature of the probJ.em under the above assump tions
regardi ng the variab les of the model.

For a medium -term solutio n of the

time-p ath of the liquidi ty-mar gin Lt, the values of the instrum ent variab
les,
viz., i, a and).. can be assumed to be unchan ging and the two variab les
x and
mare determ ined outside the system.

As mention ed elsewh ere in the paper,

the repercu ssions of Ft (the gross inflow of capital ) are likely to
reduce
the liquid ity margin during the medium -term with the

possib ility of

sharp increas es in the value of imports and a less than remark able change
in the value of exports during the period .

The model, it is interes ting

to note, is particu larly suitabl e to provide a meanin gful solutio n for
the
medium term (say, when t does not exceed 25) since the instrum ents are
less
likely to have constan t values 1-1hen the institu tions are subjec t to
change s.
What is more, the model with its uncl-:anr,ing parame ters is comple tely
inadeq uate to explain the s:l_tuaticn: ~-:h2neve:. Lt (define d
negativ e.

~

ante) is

Thus the ex post financi ng of a liquid ity crisis implies a

change in at least one among the three parame ters with or withou t simila
r
change s in the exogeno us growth rates for exports and import s.

The

model, clearly , has to be redefin ed in such a situati on with new values
both
for the differe nt variab les and for the inital conditi ons.
The liquidi ty-mar gin Lt can be defined in terms of Bt and one can get

(la)

.L

(1

)'.

+

71)1.

0

where a=l - A and B=(i + o).
The time path of Lt and Bt are defi.ned by the following two difference
equations:
(lb)

- xax (1
0

+

r

x)-

+ mAM 0 (1 +

m)

t

and
(3a)

(i

+ l)(B
· t

B.

r- 1

)

+ mn

o

(1

+ m)t-l - xx

o

(1 + x)t-l

Both the equations can be simplified in terms of the operator notation
E to obtain,

(4)

=

L (E - 1) + aSB (E - l)

t

(5)

t

t-

+ mAM

xaX (1 + x)0

B (E - 1) (E - i - 1) = mM (J.
t
0

+

0

(1

+ m)

t

,n) t - xx (1 + x) t
0

The second-order difference-equation in Bt can be solved to get the
following analytical colution for the initial values B and B ,
0
1
B = M (1 + m)t/(m - i) + K (1 + i)t - X (1 + x)t/(x - i)
t

where K

2

O

0

2 = (B 1 - B0 -. mM0 / (rn - i) + xx 0 / ( x - i) ) / i

The above, when substituted back to equation (4) can be used to solve the
value for Lt and one gets the following for an initial value of L

:

0

Lt= X (1 + x)t(l + 13/ (x - i)) + M (1 + m)t(A - aS/(m - i)) - aSK (1 + i)t + K
0
0

2

where K = L
3

0

+ aSK'> ~

aX {l
0

+

_13_) - H {A - ~ )

X-i

0

m-i

3

It i.s sign5.fJ.cant to note that •;,1hile the time-path of Lt is determined
by the coefficient of the dominant root in the long-run, the intermediat e
solutions to the long-run can be significant ly influenced by the changing
weights of the different roots correspondin g to different assumptions
regarding the variables and the initial values.

Such a case is particularl y

likely when the three roots assume small numerical values close to

one

another and the coefficient s are more important in determining the solution.
A simple exercise in numerical figures is sufficient to illustrate and
establish the above statement.

It is interesting to analyse a case which

approximate s the Indian situation with its implication s for the choice
of the instrument variables open to the policy-make r. 13

The following

include certain plausible values for the parameters and the exogenous
variables.

The estimates include the initial conditions for India during

1965-66 and seeke to project the liquidity-ma rgirc situation for the next
few decades when i and
unit y.

0

are unchangi.r.~ and 1, is eiven at a value less than

14,15

Solution 1

i=0.06
m=o.05

i>m>x

Initial conditions:

X =8.3
0

H =12.5
0

x=0.04

B

0

=16.5

).=0.10

B =21.5
1

a=0.06

L =6.94
0

One can compute the values for K and K from the above figures and
2
3

-·
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the general solution for Lt is as follows:
L = -37.35(1.04)t + 136.25(1.0S)t - 91.8(1.06)t - 0.5
t

The dominant root as well as one other root have negative
coefficients in the solution and Lt tapers off uith a value of 3.02
for t=lO to one of -3.88 for t=l5 and -160.99 for t=40.
Solution 2. x>m>i
Initial conditions:

x=0.06

L =7.39
0

m=0.05
Rest as above.

i=0.03
A and a as above.

Lt= 29.88(1.06)t - 48.75(1.0S)t + 27.13(1.03)t - 8.60
The solution is predominantly positive both in the medium and in the long
term while the close value of x and m makes for a temporary decline in the
value of Lt when tis 15.
Solution 3.

m>i>x

x=0.03

Initial conditions:

B =21.5
1
L =7.06

m=0.06

0

i=0.05
Rest as above
Lt= -33.61(1.03)t - 122.50(1.06)t + 163.25(1.0S)t - .04
The solution diverges towards larger negative values over time as it can
be seen from the table given below.

x=0.05
m=0,04

Initial conditions:

L = 6.94
0

i=O.O6
L

t

= -82.17 (1.0S) t + 68.75 (L04) t + 20.C9 (l.06) t - 0.33

The soluti on assume s a liegati ve value j_n the. long run only
when t
is 20.
S olutio n 5.

ro~ >i

x=O.O5

Initia l condit ions:

L =7.39
0

m=O.O6
i=0.O3
L =41.08 (1.0S) t - 32.50( 1.06)t - 0.31(1 .03)t - 0.39
t
The soluti on, again, is neg2.ti ve in the longer run.
Soluti on 6.
x=O.O6

x >i >m
Initia l condit ions:

1 =7.06
0

m=.03
i=0.05

L =89.6 4(1.06 )t + G3.12 (1.03) t - l~.55( 1.05)t - 131.11

. t

The soluti on repres ents the most favour able situat ion with
the smalle st

value of m.
The soluti ons record ed in the table reveal it signif icantl y
that
the liquid ity-ma rgin Lt is influe nced to a large extent by
both the intere st
rate and by the relati ve value of x and m (compa re soluti ons
1,4;
2,5; 3,6 where relati ve change s in x and m bring about signif
icant
change s in Lt for unchan ging rates of intere st).

The time-p ath of Lt

for the long-r un, while dominatE.:d by the coeffi cients for the
more domina nt

-14-

cr=.06

-·-------

·,

j

i>m>x
· Solution 1

x>m>i
2

.04

.06

03

.06

.03

.05

.05

X

t

i

m

m>i>x

:L>x>rn

>-= .10
m>x>i
5

x>i>m
6

.05

.05

.06

.05

.Wi

.03

.05

. 06

.04

.06

.03

4

3

1

- - - ,I
10

3.02

5.57

--2. gg

4. '.>1

7.21

99.04

15

-3.88

4.03

--5. Sf;

2.16

5.79

151. 32

20

-14.88

7.23

- ~? 1 . l;. -~·

--LU

'='. 0.

232.32

25

-29.41

11. 02

.,.43, 99

-- 7. 25

40

-160.99

43.80

-219.6'.!

-:'S.11

';
0:,,"'

\..

I

--2. 2c.';.

336 .18

.93

893. 72

-Li?

root, is often influenced by the second dominant root with larger
values for its coefficients when the absolute values of the different
roots are close to onE'. another.

Thus '.:he stracturaJ. relation of the

three variables, x, m and i, when close to :.me an::;ther, are more significant

than their absolute values in dE te:ridLin;~ the marrin of liquidity.

It

is also significant to note that sma~.::. r.1argin<-.l chang-:.>s :::.r-. the three
variables (e.g. between

solutions 'f and 6) can bring about spectacular

changes in the margin of liq:.ddity.

There can even be a temporary reversal

in the direct:Lon of change of the liquidity-margin durin3 the shortterm (solution 2, t=lS) folloFed by a more consistent trend for the longer
run.

The major directions in the time-path of Lt will be unchanged when

the solutions are different with a different set of figures for A and cr.

-15-

The crucial bearing of the equality conditio n :;.n the solution s, however
,

makes the siruat1.·o
n itself
c:iff-2.re
rt •,1ben I 't ci-.~naes
-'ts
sign
from a
•-~- b
-'.,
positive figure.
The signific ant nuture of the equal!ty conditio n in the
liquidit y-margi n requi::-crn_e;1t

J 1 akes

it impc_ tant to ff.nd out the cri-

tical values of ,, , the liquid port:f on o:'- 2-o,,,n.s Fi th a non--neg ative

(say zero) value of It "hid, is cons-.~st er.t ,·.'it:h
values for the rest of the Vfiri:iblc: ,~;.

&

set of plausib le

'l_'he instituti or.a::. pattern

of borrowin g with la:i'.'ge 'Tolumes cf tied 1rnrchss es (i.e., a small >..)

makes it difficu lt for the iJOrrowin ()' countrie s to meet the liqt:!idit y
margin requirem ent at the conventio na.1. terns of such borrowin g coupled
with the more likely rates of grm,•th for ttei r

exports and imports.

Or, to put it otherwi se, the norrno.l c2:1x·r-:: perfo-.:-n: ance 2nd t':1e import
requirem ents of the recipi<':n t c0untri.e s make £or an inev:.tab le
liquidit y crisis for the reci.pie:1 t rountrie t: unless tl1ere t2Jcc place
a change in the terms of their forecic;TI bcrr'.Y.,iP L (viz.
rate, maturity or the :Liquid cornpor:2 nt of loam;).

l:.'

interest

The followin g

table illustra tes the basic dilernmci and the inconsis tencj_es of the
current institut ional structur e ½etHe.:m the lenc:1-:1.nr; and the borrowin g
countri es.
and a

Thus a moderate estimate of mat 6 per cent per annum

linear rate of amortis ation within 15 years make it difficu lt

to avoid a liquidit y crisis uithin a twenty- five year time-pe riod
unless i) the growth rate for exports is sufficie ntly high, ii) the
rate of interes t is sufficie ntly low or, iii) the liquid ratio of

-16-

It is interestinr; to note that the

loans, A is sufficiently large.

Choice of the four major irn:.truve:1::s s.r'.d variables in the model, viz.
i, cr, A and x are often beyond the cc•nt:col of the recipient while
a drastic change in the. ir:irort-grcwth rate 'm' is also hard to
attain.

Again, the predominance of tie,J credits (i.•~., a small A

for any value of Ft), the diff:1_culties of increasing the export
growth rates for the developing countries, the increasing import
coefficient of domestic production, and lastlyj the rising cost
(i.e.higher interest rate ard shorter maturity) of foreign capital
make it hard for the borroHers to attain a set of the relevant
variables cons:Lstent with a non-negative liquidity margin.

Critical values of A for Lt=O
B =16.5, X =8.3, M =12.5
0

0

0

m=.C-6, ::c=.06, t=25

X

.04

.05

.03

.28

.14

*

.04

*

.22

.18

.OS

.90

.15

.06

*

*
*

i

• 1)6

*

The table works out the critical values of:>.. for Lt=O under
different assumptions regarding
values form and

at 0.6.

time-period at t=25.

x

and i and a set of unchanging

The solution is worked out for a finite

The spaces marked by asteriks indicate certain
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values of

;i..

which are not mE.anins£u1 under the given circumsta nces.

The large proportio n of tied loans in the grass inflow of loans
for India during the recent years (see Appendix Table 2 for the
value of;\ between 10 to 15 per cent) toeether with the typical
terms of such borrowing (see Appendix Table 1) make it hard for
the country to meet the liquidity condition for the typical
rates of increase of her imports and exports during the srowth
process.

Thus even an optimisti c estimate of the export growth

rate at 6 per cent require a;>,. at 18 or 15 per cent for certain
plausible estimates of the terms of loans and the import growth
rate.

The table, however, reveals clearly the opposite influence

of x as compared to

j_

or o in relation to given

values of Lt.

The few solutions worked out above. do n·ot provide
a complete exercise in the sensitivi ty of the liquidity margin
for given changes in the ter;~, of fc:::ei.8n horrm-Jir,g or in the growth
rates for exports a:1.c' :'r:morts.

Th::-, t 1.~c ·:3_1:-•els, however, illustrat e

it perfectly well that the s~~uctura : condit~on s of the economy
can be as important as the termfc ,,f fore:1 rn borrowing in determini ng

the liquidity- marp:in for the borr0Pe::-s .

Th'.ls Lt may be chane;ed

with certain marginal adjustmen ts ~n the values of x and m even
without a correspon ding chaq'.e in the tenns of borrowing i and cr.
The model illustrat es the nec~ssity of recognisin g the
liquidity- requirem ent as a pre-cond ition for a successfu l process
of debt-cum growth.

The whole of ~:nalysis, of course, is based

-18-

on the prior hypothesis that the: h'.J!T:>wing countries do not
anticipate an indefinite increase in their outstanding indebtedness.
Thus the process of refinancing the loans, while permissible in
the immediate future, has to be accepted with caution, especially
when it chanees both the volume as well as the terms of borrowing.
The model may usefully be applied to anticipate a liquidity
crisis for the Indian economy.

While

the initial conditions

relate to the Indian situation for 1965-66, one can choose the
particular solutions more appropriate to the projections available
in different estimates.

Thus a liberal estimate of the projected

19 .
·
d import
·
.
expor t earnings
an.
payments
Justi'f ya c h oice
of
solution 2 while a different 2.ssumption regardinp the interest
rate and some variations in the values of the variables can lead
to situation 4 Hith an inevitable liquidity crisis.

A conservative

estimate of the weighted average of interest does not, for ohvious

reasons, save the situation, as indicated in Solution 5.

Solutions

1 and 5 are possible under a less optim:Lstic assumption rer;arding
the two exogenous variables, x a.nd re, while solution 6 represents
the most interesting typr?. of a situation under the given assumption
of a small value for ~- when imports can be restricted to a minimal
value, a situation which is not lLcely for India.

The solutions,

taken together, indicate explicitly the. strong nossitility of a
liquidity crisis for the Indian economy in the not too distant
future under the existing institutional features of her external

borrowinp, and her trade potent::.alities.

III. Conclusions
The anaJ.ysis prov~.<lEF an

exen:iE:es L:to the con,:_;e-

quences of external bo::-rovir_g for the recinients when the capital
inflows are tied to unfr.vourai.1le lnc•.r: tcr;, s u::l.th contractual
purchases in the current account.

The lessons of the exercise

are instructive for the develop:~ng countries where public
interest-bearing loans form a ~ajor portion of the total capital
inflows.

There has, however, been a no less striking increase

in the flow of official transfers (a.swell as local currency
loans) to these countries during the last two decades.

The above

analysis points out the paradoxical situation where the composition
of the gross inflow of capital is often incompatible to the
requirements of the recipients fo~ liouid foreifn resources.
Thus increases in the volume of tied aids and in official
transfers (in their present form of commodity e;rants) are incapable
to meet the liquidity r12..rgin requirements of the borrowine;
countries.

The situation represents a structural imbalance under

the present circumstances when the donors are unable or unwilling
to provide liberal loan tenns or free exchange to the recipients
while the latter find it particularly difficult to reduce the
gap over the course of their economic development.

trade

The logical

corollary of the above for the policy makers is a choice between
an increased inflow of gross borrowing at less favourable terms
and a possible change in the institutional parameters like i,
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a and~ and also, a careful scrutiny of the structural pattern of
the different variables and the parameters.

These can, however,

always be a short-term solution to a liquidity crisis in terms
of a rescheduling of loans hy the donor.

The device, while

providin~ in effect 'liquid' resources to the borrower, shelves
the ,d:wle problem to the longer nm uhen the liquidity problem
emerges once again while the foreigners are in a position to
claim a larger portion of the G.:_:,P. than before.
It may be relevant in the above context to refer to the
efficiency limit

20

for investment postulated in the resource-

gap models of foreign aid.

The relative changes in the yield

of capital beyond the stated limit of efficiency lends itself
easily to a case of outrieht income grants from the donor country
.
f or f urt h er trans f ers o f l oan capita.
· 1 21
as a substitute
Similarly, one may advocate a substitution of loans by grants
whenever the rate of return of investment is low at the borrm-1ing
country Hith increased costs of such borrowing.

The approach,

while useful with its attempt to rationalise the flmr of resources
between different countries in terms of the maximisation of world
income, pre-supposes an institutional set-up which is hardly
consistent with reality.

Thus the existing fiscal and monetary

set-up in the donor countries hardly permits an unlimited substi
tutability between loans and grants, or even, betueen loans

-21-

relati ng to diffe~ ent tena struct ures.

The value of ioans as a

propo rtion of G.N.P. in the donor areas and as a share of the
total
value of resour ce transf ers from the same area are determ ined
in a given time period when econom ic instit ution s do not change
.
The residu al part of resour ce transf ers takes the form of loans
sensit ive to a consid erable extent to the terms offere d in the
marke t.

Thus the implic ations of the advers e change s in the terms

of loans for the aid-cu m growth proces s can hardly be qualif
ied
by the possi bility of compe nsation s with income grants .
The proble m might be entire ly differ ent under a situat ion
where privat e capita l is more impor tant in the total inflow
of
foreig n resour ces.

1;Jhile the rate of return on such capita l might

even be higher , the absenc e of repaym ent obliga tions under
direct

invest ment and the stimu lative effect of such invest ment for
certai n
expor ts might make the liquid ity condit ion less diffic ult.

One

can here refer to the rela~i ve ease with which some Latin
Americ an
count ries includ ing Brazi l, Argen tina and t--rexico were able
to

servic e their extern al debt durin~ the last decade .

of privat e capita l inflm-

1

,

The implic ations

howev er, ar~. compl etely differ ent and

often oppos ite for the foreig n resour ce gaps and one has to
take
note of differ ent consid eratio ~s before comme nting on the relati
ve
desira bility of any situat ion.
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FOOTNOTES
1.

"One technical problem seems almost certain to arise,

if Aid can only take the fonn of P.L. 480 or of loans imported
for specific projects; it would be impossibl e for India to find
the free foreign exchange to cover debt repaymen ts, essential
materials , etc., and plan for projects not in the Aid programme .
I doubt whether this would suffice to avert the need for some
generally available aid --- or at least for Aid which could be
used to repay trade debts and refinance old loans."

Reddaway,

W.D., "The Role of External Aid: reprinted in The United States
and the Developin g Economies , edited by Ranis, Gustav, pp. 12930.

(First italics mine)
2.

For the standard expositio n of the two-gap models of

foreign aid which do not explicitl y take into account the
repayment process, see Chenery and Bruno /2/, McKinnon /11/.
3.

The liquidity margin requireme nt is defined as the

differenc e between the total exchange infloHs (from exports and
from foreign loans) and outflows (due to debt-serv ices and the
non-proje ct imports) for a country during a certain period.
4.

See Rahman /12/ for the implicati ons of debt-serv icing on

the goal of self-relia nce.
a.

To simplify matters, one need not introduce the third

dimension and be content with two axes represent ing the average
loan terms (interest and maturity) and the quantity of loans
respectiv ely.

5.

The hypoth esis can be verifi ed by actual experi ences of

the borrow ing countr ies during the last decade .

Thus the

weigh ted averag e of intere st rates and amort isation s on foreig
n
loans repaya ble in foreig n exchan ge has eone up
·for India

during the period 1956 to 1966. (See Appen dix

table 1)
6.

See Avramoric~ et al, for an excell ent expos ition of the

reperc ussion of debt-c harges on the saving s-inve stmen t gap.
7.

See Qayum A. /10/

Under the simple st assum ption of an absenc e of gestat ion
and payme nts lag, the net saving s coeffi cient S* for a certai
n
capita l inflow K is repres ented by the follow ing formu la:
m
Km

t

where o = capita l: output ratio·:

c=m,p. c.; r=rate

of intere st on loans: t = end year of the loan; K = initia l
m

capita l inflow .

For a given value of K equal to unity, the value of S* is
m
signif icantl y affect ed by change s in the differ ent variab les
of
the model includ ing rand t.

What is more, S* can assume negati ve

values for certai n ranges of the variab les

a situat ion hard

to justif y unless increa ses in consum ption are suffic ient to
compe nsate it.
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The analysis, in order to l,e more relevant for practical purposes,
should be modified by the fellowing considerations:
(i)

That part of the initial capital inflow Km may be
This affects the value of S* considerably.

consumed.
(ii)

That the amount of savings and consumption out of the
additional domestic product generated by Km depends on the

choice of the disposable income-unit.

The specific assumption

of the G.D.P. as the disposable unit of income in the Qayum
analysis may not always confonn to the reality and one may use
fully introduce alternative assumptions like the GNP concept at
factor cost or the GNP net of repayments concept as the relevant
The alternative formulations for the

unit of disposable income.

savings coefficient would be as follows:
(a)

s

I

s

I

n =

S"

(b)

S*

-

(1

c) [Ko

-1

m

l

-

-

n-1
K (1 - .--)r]
t
m

<..!;£.)t-n+l
1 - 1-c

+

K
m

*

= !.t S' n
n=l

n

n--1
-1
= (1 - c) [Kma - Km (1 - -t) r

=

t
~l

....C'"

n

~
t

-

0

1

-·

K
- ...E!]

t

(1-c)t-n+l
a .

1

-

1--::
O'

where S' and S" refer to the GNP concepts at factor cost and
net of repayments respectively.

8.

See Ohlin /7/.
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9.

T-Je define the 'foreip:n resource zap' as the sum of

merchandise balance and <lebt-servi.,::2 payments (i.e. as the gross
capital inflow Ft=Mt -Xt+(i+a) Bt) and distinguish it from the
foreign exchange or the

I

li1_uicl.ity requirement' Lt in the strict

sense of the tenn.
10.

See Cooper, Richard, /4/ for an explanation of the

donor's interest for tied aids in tenns of the liquidity
requirement.

Also see the Appendix table 2 for an actual estimate

of the proportion of tied loans for India.
11.

The ratio, defined conventionally as the proportion of

export-earnings absorhed by debt-services, gets an additional
implication in the above approach towards the theory of foreign
aid.
12.

The assumption of an exogenous grm-rth rate in exports

and imports can be justified for a:1 economy Phere imports are
maintained at a minimum level consister.t nith domestic growth
targets while the rate of export growtl-'. is subject more to external
rather than to domestic repercussions.

assumes away the tenns of trade

Similarly the model

effect .of

the tied loans with

its hypothesis that the value of A does not influence the real
content of the grLss inflow of resources. Lastly, the assumption
of an unchanging interest rate and amortisation period deals
away with all complications of a difference between the marginal
and the average terms of borrowing.

\
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13.

The Ir.di.an case. i.s illm,trative for the rest of the less

developed nations which are inclined towards large scale public
borrowing at conventional terms.

Thus India received a large

amount of capital inflow during the development decade and the
pattern of such inflows had been fairly representative of the
more recent trends with a large share of public loans at nonconcessional terms.
14

The model, as indicated above, excludes transfers and

other local currency loans which do not call for repayments in free
exchange.

The equations for outstanding indebtedness, Bt and

for the liquidity margin Lt ac.cordin~ly overestimate such values
for a given resource·-gap

0\ --

Xt).

The numerical computations,

however, are not significantly c~arr:ed once one mal:es the plausible
assumption that the rate of incr,?ases in imports and grants
conform to each other.

Thus one may recalculate the time-path

of Lt on the basis of a different initial value of imports H

'

,-ihich

0

is smaller than M by the amount of grants G used to finance such
0

0

imports during the initial period.

The above, to repeat it, is

permissible under the assumption that the rate ~or the growth of
overall imports mis identical to the corresponding rate for the
growth of grants G .
0

A relatively small ratio of imports to

transfers during the initial period (as it obtains for India with
a figure of 0.10 for 1964 in spite of the large absolute value
of transfer receipts), however, makes the model perfectly general

even withou t the necessa ry qualifi cation s for the initial value
of M.
15.

The value of A at 0.10 approxi mates the 12% share

for non-pr oject loans for the u~utili sed portion of loans
(repaya ble in foreign exchang e) hy the end of 1965-66 (See table
1 in Append ix)
The initia l conditi ons inclvde the figures for 1965-66 for
exports and imports (Rs 8376

r.,

and Ls 12522m respec tively) .

The

figures for outstan dinr, debt are recorde d for 1965 as it is
reporte d in a mimeog rap:,ed nubJ_ic ation of the IBPD at Ps 16510m (B )
0

while the non-av ailabil ity of dat.s. regardi nr; the utilise d portion
of loans for 1966 has 1ed tu

;_1

:r:-01.:ncabout nethod for computi nr;

the corresp onding fip,ure for the year.
from the definit ion 0£ J'.

l

I'nus B as compute d
1

is sli£;ht1 y differe nt from one case

to another as the interer ,t rates are difff!re nt in each case.
Simila rly, the absE:mce of an ind:::pe ndent officia l series relatin g
to Lt leads to differe nces in the initial values 1
assump tions regardi ng the parame ters.

0

for differe nt

The qualita tive implic ations

of the solutio n, howeve r, are not underm ined by the above device s.
19.

The conser vative estima tes relate to the projec tions

by Manmohan Singh /14/ who predic ts a mzximum amount of exports
for 1970-71 at Rs 10,000m and that hy nacDou gall G.D.A. , /9/ whose
estima tes for imports of 1970-71 specify a minimum of Rs 14,000m
to 15,000m .

The libera l estima te of future projec tions relate

to the Perspe ctive Plannin r, Divisio n analys is of the Indian

Planning Commission ,dth its respective est:Lnates of expor~s and
imports for 1970-71 at ~s 12,25C.in and Ps 13,M,0TI'.
20.

Defined as the 'absorptive capacity' for the borrowing

countries,
21.

See Pincus /8/, Schmidt /13/ and Cooper /3/.

APPEFDIX
Table 1.

Average interest rate and

Amortisation

Payments on Loans Repayable in Foreign
Exchange:

Years

India

! Inter:st
ra:,e
(percentage,:,)
i

A~ortisation Period
(1:,:eighted Average)

j (weightec1. av'c?.rage)

1956

.70

60

1957

1.00

S7

1958

1.06

7L,

1959

1.32

Id

1960

" 7'
L.
, l.

29

1961

3.6G

20

1962

3.27

~!6

1963

3.17

32

3.56

34

l 1964
!

Source: Data supplied by the I.B.F.D.
Economics Department. October 14, 1966.

Share

External Assistance:
Pattern of
-

-

of_ Project_ Aid in Tot2_l Loans Repayable
in Foreign C:urrenc':_ (Fs millions)

Total

Grants

(1)

(2)

Loans
Repayable
in Foreign
Currency

Total
Project
Aid· Repayable in
Foreign
Currency

(4) as a
percentage
share of
(5)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1. Untilisation

up to Harch 56

2017

702

1241

488

39.3

2. Undisbursed
end of March 56

1801

678

882

86

9.7

3. Utilisation
end of March 61

14298

1603

6C'79

4096

67.6

4. Undisbursed
end of March 61

12541

287

5312

658

12.4

5. Utilisation
end of March 66

28503

877

17530

7455

42.5

16. Undisbursed
jend of Harch 66

12322

'.216

10?39

9547

88.0

1

Source Reserve Bank of India.

Reports on Currency and Finance. 1965-66.
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